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practice continues the bifurcated trial process could be utilized to
avoid the unfairness of the present situation.
PENDER R. MCELROY

Labor Law-Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation
as an Unfair Labor Practice
Since 1962 the National Labor Relations Board has held that
the failure of a union to represent its members fairly is an unfair
labor practice.' The NLRB has used Sections 8(b) (A), 2 8(b)2 3
and 8(b) 34 of the National Labor Relations Act to reach this result.
'Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). See e.g., Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150
N.L.R.B. 312 (1964); Automobile Workers Union, 149 N.L.R.B. 482
(1964); Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964);
Independent Metal Workers Union, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
'Section 8(b) 1 provides in part that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for a union or its agents "to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph
shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. .. "
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 140 (1947),

29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)

(1964).

Section 7 provides "Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities. . . ." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
' Section 8(b)2 provides in part that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for a union or its agents "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such
organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his
failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required
as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. . . .' 61 Stat. 141
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1964).
Section 8(a)3 provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ... " 61 Stat 140 (1957), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1964).
'Section 8(b)3 provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
union or its agents "to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,
provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions
ship in any labor organization. . . ." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (3) (1964).
Section 8(d) provides in part "to bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the em-
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Until recently appellate review of these opinions has been limited to
one inconclusive case.5 Now the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, in a landmark decision, has approved the Board's use of
Section 8(b) (1) (A) to reach unfair representation by unions, leaving unanswered the question of whether or not the Board's reliance
on Section 8(b)2 and 8(b)3 was proper.
In Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB' the local union
had refused to process the grievances of eight Negro members concerning discrimination in employment. The Negroes complained that
racially separate plant facilities were maintained. Further, they complained that separate seniority rolls for white male, Negro male, and
female employees were maintained prior to 1962 despite the fact that
the bargaining contract appeared to give seniority without regard
to race or sex. During this period the complainants had been laid
off for a year. The eight Negro employees executed affidavits that
during the period of the layoff new white workers had been hired in
violation of their seniority rights. The union grievance committee
concluded that no contract violation existed and that a union complaint would therefore be baseless. The complainants appealed within the union structure and the union's international president held
that the grievance should be processed. However, Local 12 still refused to process the grievances and in October 1962 unfair labor
practices charges were filed with the labor board. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the NLRB's finding of a Section 8(b) (1) (A)
violation,7 but failed to consider the Board's application of Sections
8(b)2 and 8(b)3 to the case.
Neither the National Labor Relations Act nor the Railway Labor
Act specifically states that a union owes a duty of fair representation to the employees it represents. The concept of fair representation had its genesis in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.,9 a 1944 deployees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotoation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution
of a written contract . . . but such obligation does not compel either party
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. . . ." 61 Stat.

140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
"Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962, enforcement denied, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). The decision by a three judge panel involved a
majority opinion, a concurrence on different grounds and a dissent.
' 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
7Id. at 24.
44 Stat. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63 (1964).
'323 U.S. 192 (1944).

1967]

DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION

1079

cision of the United States Supreme Court. There the court held
that a union could not negotiate a contract which would result in
Negro employees, who were not union members, losing job opportunities. The court found that under the Railway Labor Act a union
is given the exclusive right to represent all employees and as the
exclusive bargaining representative is required to "represent nonunion or minority union members of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, and impartially, and in good faith.""' This is not
to say that there cannot be relevant differences, but "discriminations
based on race alone are obviously irrelevant and individious."' " Because Section 9(a) 12 of the National Labor Relations Act makes
the union an exclusive bargaining agent, the Supreme Court in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB' s recognized that the duty of fair representation
exists under this act also.
Steele and Wallace may have seemed sufficient for the enforcement of the duty of fair representation, but they actually established
a judicial remedy of limited value. 4 A party faced delay, expense,
and technical barriers when he carried his complaint into the courts.
The first application of the effective administrative remedy of unfair labor practice proceeding 5 for breach of the duty of fair repre'0 Id. at 204.
"Id. at 203.
Section 9(a) provides " Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees . . . shall
12

be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment.... ." 61 Stat. 143, U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1964).
12323 U.S. 248 (1944).
', For discussions on the sufficiency of the judicial remedy see SoVRN,
ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 144-60
(1966); Cox, The Duty of FairRepresentation,2 VILL. L. REv. 151, 172-77
(1957); Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation under Taft-Hartley, 30

LEGAL RESTRAINTS

Mo. L. REv. 373, 374-77 (1965); Rosen, The Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 729, 771-81 (1965); Sovern, The
National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,62 COLUM. L. REv.
563, 609-13 (1962).
"5There are other administrative remedies available in addition to unfair labor practice proceedings. One method used by the Board to discourage a union becoming or remaining an exclusive representative is the
removal of the contract bar. Normally the NLRB makes a collective bargaining agreement a bar to a new election for three years. However, in
Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962) the Board implied that discrimitory contracts would not bar a new election. Independent Metal Workers
Union, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) the Board overruled previous decisions which allowed a union to retain certified status while it excluded
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sentation came in 1962 with NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co." The
union had requested that one of its members be reduced in seniority
when circumstances indicated no valid reason for this demand.
Under pressure from the union the employer acquiesced and the
employee was reduced in seniority. The majority of the Board indicated that Section 7 protected employees from such "invidious treatment by their exclusive bargaining agent in matters affecting their
employment."'1 7 The remedy for such discrimination was available
under Section 8(b) (1) (A). Further, the Board found violations of
Sections 8(b)2 and 8(b)3"8 which impose duties on both unions
and employers not to conduct themselves in such a manner as to encourage or discourage union membership. Presumably, the union by
demonstrating its arbitrary power forced non-members and members
in poor standing to become active in union affairs to preserve their
jobs."0 Two Board members dissented in Miranda pointing out that
the concept of fair representation had not been advanced or litigated
in the case and that the legislative history of the act did not support
the interpretation of the majority.20 On appeal enforcement was denied, but the court was badly split and did not really decide whether
the new theory was valid."' Until Rubber Workers this was the
only appellate decision dealing with fair representation as an unfair
labor practice.
Racial discrimination was not involved in Miranda so it remained for Hughes Tool' to extend the theories of Miranda into
that area. In Hughes Tool Locals 1 and 2 of the Independent Metal
Workers Union had been certified as joint bargaining representatives; Local 1 was white and Local 2 was Negro. After a bid for
an apprenticeship by a Negro employee was refused consideration
by the company, the grievance committee of Local 2 protested.
Negro employees from membership and classified or segregated its members on a racial basis.
1 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.
1963).
17 140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
'Oid. at 185.
°See note 3 supra.
"Accord, Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30 Mo. L. Rav. 373, 382 (1965). Contra, SovERx, LEGAL RESTRAINTS
ON RACIAL DiscamniNAToN IN EMPLOYMENT 163 (1966) where it is
averred that Congress implicitly accepted Steele and gave Negroes the right
of equal treatment when Taft-Hartley was enacted in 1947.
"326 F.2d at 172.
"147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
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When this failed to get results, Local 1 was asked to intervene. The
Board affirmed the trial examiners finding that Sections 8(b) (1)
(A), 8(b)2, and 8(b)3 were violated because Local 1 refused to
process grievances as requested.
In Hughes Tool the majority of the Board expanded its theory
to include Section 8(b)3, and the dissenters of Miranda clarified
their opposition to holding unfair representation an unfair labor
practice. The principal dispute among the Board members concerned
the technicalities of the application of the first three Sections of 8(b)
to fair representation, but there was a related schism involving the
philosophy of the function of the NLRB. In Hughes Tool the majority of the Board cited Brown v. Board of Educ 3 and Shelley v.
Kraemer24 for the proposition that racial segregation in union membership, when engaged in by an exclusive bargaining agent under
the NLRA, cannot be condoned by a "Federal Agency." 25 This line
of thought can be linked to the Steele case which recognized the
possibility that a favored status under a statute might be enough to
make collective bargaining governmental action and hold a union to
constitutional standards 6 However, no Supreme Court opinion has
yet held that the Constitution requires a union and employer not to
discriminate.
The reasoning of the majority in effect makes the
NLRB a fair employment practices committee for it becomes the
function of the Board to use its power to eliminate discrimination.
The minority of the Board replied that Congress up to that time
had been unable to pass fair employment legislation and that it was
clearly not the congressional intent that the NLRA operate as a
substitute.2 8 Further, it may be argued that collective bargaining
operates best with a minimum of interference, governmental or
otherwise. For this reason application of constitutional standards to
fair representation by unions might disrupt collective bargaining by
requiring burdensome judicial and administrative regulation. It appears possible to the advocates of the minority view that the application of constitutional standards to collective bargaining could seri-'347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"334 U.S. 1 (1948).
' 147 N.L.R.B. at 1574 & n.3.
28
For a discussion of this possibility see Rosen, The Law and Racial
Discriminationin Employment, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 729, 750-56 (1965).
Steele was based on an interpretation of the Railway Labor Act.
Hughes Tool, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1578-93 (1964) (separate opinion).
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hamper"9

the Board in implementing the act's principal goal of
ously
promoting union-employer relations because strict constitutional
standards would result in a loss of necessary flexibility in collective
bargaining.f0
The advocates of each viewpoint manifest the basic split in philosophy by their varied interpretations of Section 8(b) and its related
provisions. The approach of the minority of the Board emphasizes
statutory intent and is strictly an argument of logic, while the results
reached by the majority, although at times seemingly based on illogical reasoning, are more equitable. An example of this is the interpretation put on Section 8(b) (1) (A) by the majority of the Board
in Rubber Workers.' The reasoning in this opinion was simply
that by refusing to process grievances the respondent union "restrained or coerced" the Negro employees in exercising their right
to be represented without invidious discrimination. The Board
stated simply that there was no justification for the refusal to process
the grievances since the sole reason for the refusal was racial discrimination. The dissenters freely admitted a duty of fair representation under Section 9(b),3 but indicated that there was nothing in
the legislative history to indicate a congressional intent to make fair
representation a protected Section 7 right.33 They argued that an
unfair labor practice occurs only where there is conduct relating to
"union membership, loyalty, the acknowledgment of union authority, or the performance of union obligation. 134 Reasoning that the
refusal to process a grievance did not relate to any of these factors,
the minority found no unfair labor practice within the meaning of
Section 8(b) (1) (A). The fifth circuit expressly repected this narrow view of Section 8(b) (1) (A) stating that the breach of every
" See Rosen, The Law and Racial Discrimination in Employment, 53
L. R!v. 729, 754-56 (1965).
0
Id.at 755.
1 150 N.L.R.B. at 312.
"Section 9(b) provides:

CALIF.

The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to

the employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed
by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof...
61 stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
" 150 N.L.R.B. at 324 (dissenting opinion).
31 Id. at 325.
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other duty imposed by the act has been held an unfair labor practice
and there is no reason for this single exception.3 5
Still unanswered by the court is the propriety of the Board's use
of Sections 8 (b)2 and 8(b) 3 to enforce the duty of fair representation. Section 8(b) (1) (A) specifically gives a union the right to
establish its own regulations concerning membership, but in light of
Steele it is unclear whether a union may exclude Negroes from
membership on the arbitrary and invidious basis of race. 6 However, Section 8 (b)2 and 8(a) 3 make it clear that if workers denied
membership are then denied jobs the law is violated.3" The disagreement between the majority and the minority of the Board is over
the conclusion of the majority that Section 8(b)2 and 8(a)3 are
violated regardless of union membership or lack of it, when for
"arbitrary or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis of an unfair classification, the union attempts to cause or does cause an employer to
derogate the employment status of an employee."3" The critical question is whether the conclusion of the Board is tenable on the somewhat strained logic that an employee will be encouraged to be a
"good union" member because he sees the union coerce the employer
to arbitrarily discriminate against a fellow worker. The minority
sees no direct effect on union membership by such arbitrary conduct
for the discrimination is unrelated to the union activities of the employee. 9 Although this view is logical, the majority position seems
more responsive to actual human behavior. Fear of the union's
power to discriminate arbitrarily results in union members striving
to remain on good terms with the union, and this necessarily entails
maintaining union membership.
The use of Section 8(b)3 by the Board to reach unfair representation by the union raises some interesting problems of statutory
interpretation. This section can be viewed in at least two ways as
observed by Professor Archibald Cox:
" 368 F.2d 12, 21 (5th Cir. 1966).

"See 93 CONG. REc. 4193 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
" See SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DIscRIMINATION
PLOYMENT 165 (1966).

IN EM-

"' Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 186 (1962), enforcement denied,
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
" Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964). The
same division present on the Board in Miranda continues here but is clarified to some extent.
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The critical inquiry would seem to be whether section 8(b)3
should be construed: (1) to regulate only the union's conduct in
relation to employer, or (2) to embody all its statutory obligations in negotiating or administering an agreement as the employees' exclusive representative. The former interpretation
leaves room for judicial remedies for breach of the duty of fair
representation. The latter makes breach of the duty an unfair
labor practice .... 40

The Board has followed the second view that the "duty to bargain
collectively includes the duty to represent fairly.1 41 The Board reasoned earlier in Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n 2 that Section 8(d)43 contemplated only lawful agreements and that bargaining agreements which discriminated invidiously were unlawful.
Thus, employers and unions were enjoined from entering such contracts. When such unlawful agreements were entered, the contract
could not be one envisioned by Section 8(d) nor could the union
be said to have bargained in good faith as to either the employees it
represents or employers.4 4 Professor Sovern and the minority of the
Board dispute this view and claim that Section 8(b)3 is simply the
counterpart of Section 8(a)5,45 with a duty only between unions
and employers to bargain collectively. 6 This is a more logical con47
clusion and the history of the act lends it support.
" Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151, 172
(1957).
" Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 897, 899 (1964).
2148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964).
"See note 4 supra.
"148 N.L.R.B. at 899-900.
"Section (8)5 provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer: "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." 61
Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(5) (1964).
,"See Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 563, 589 (1962).

"In addition to the problems raised by this paper, Rubber Workers has
implications in the area of preemption. Obiter dictum in this case approved
the doctrine of giving exclusive jurisdiction to the NLRB where the activity
was arguably subject to Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA. See San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). For a discussion
of preemption see SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT 171-74 (1966).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000(e) (1)-(11) is also beyond the scope of this note but it now serves
as an important new weapon in halting discriminatory practices by unions.
See Rosen, The Law and Racial Discriminationin Employment, 53 CALIF.
L. REV. 729 (1965); Sherman, The Union Duty of FairRepresentaton and
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 MINN. L. REV. 771 (1965).
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Regardless of the technique 8 used by the majority of the Board
to conclude that it is an unfair labor practice to breach the duty of
fair representation, the courts should hesitate to accept this result.
Under its present course of action, apparently approved in Rubber
Workers, the Board seems to have established itself as a fair employment practice committee.4 9 This development is undesirable for the
expansion of the Board's jurisdiction to include fair employment
practices has an adverse effect on the primary function of the Board,
that of supervising the collective bargaining process. Setting up fair
employment standards to be applied by the Board while labor and
management engage in collective bargaining would destroy much of
the flexibility and perhaps the effectiveness of the collective bargaining process." The extensive supervision required might amount to
little less than governmental control of labor-management relations.
To those who contend that only the administrative remedy offered
by the NLRB is sufficient,51 one might reply that a potent fair employment practices committee with power to institute court action on
a complaint or to give effective remedies for discrimination in employment could achieve the same end as the NLRB without interfering with the present function of the Board.
JAMES NATHAN DUGGINS, JR.

Securities Regulation-Unlisted Tradings: A Vanishing Art?
The historical background of unlisted trading reflects the development of our national securities exchanges. Prior to the evolution of exchanges, local brokers, gathering on street corners, would
trade in any available securities.1 In 1817, the New York Stock Ex"'For methods used by the courts to reach desired results see Blumrosen,
The Worker and Three Phases of Unionism: Administrative and Judicial

Control of the Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MicE. L. REv. 1435, 1445-46
(1963).
,"Murphy, The Duty of Fair Representation Under Taft-Hartley, 30

Mo. L. REV. 373, 385-86 (1965).
" Rosen, The Law and Racial Discriminationin Employment, 53
L. REv.729, 754 (1965).

CALIF.

"1See Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 CoLum. L. REV. 563, 609-13 (1962). See also note 13 supra.
1 [1958-1959] 25 SEC. ANN. REP. 71. As early as 1752 American mer-

chants established an "exchange" at Broad Street in New York City, for
dealings in meal and water borne produce. At the tip of Wall Street nearest

